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THE DILUTION EFFECT: FEDERALIZATION, 
FAIR CROSS-SECTIONS, AND THE 
CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY 
Laura G. Dooley* 
l NTRODUCriO!" 
The quintessential distinguishing feature of the American criminal 
justice system is the jury. Juries representative of their communities 
perform the interrelated functions in criminal trials of rendering ver-
dicts that reflect a sense of community justice and giving normative 
content to law. When those functions are successfully performed, the 
jury lends legitimacy to the criminal justice system, bolstering public 
confidence in the extant rule of law. 
Yet the criminal jury's validating functions are critically dependent 
on its own legitimacy, which in tum requires an examination of two 
key questions. First, what constitutes a "representative" jury, and sec-
ond, what is the relevant community the jury is supposed to re-
present? The first of these questions, grounded as it is in the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee that a criminal defendant enjoys the right to 
an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, 
has received a fair amount of attention from both courts and scholars.1 
The second, arguably more profound and certainly prior question, has 
remained largely unexamined.2 The purpose of this Article is to fill 
• Professor of Law. Valpara1~0 Um\·ers1ty School of Law. I thank Amitru Etz1om. Stanley 
Fish, and Ian Ayres for thear kmd and helpful comments on a prevaous draft. and my colleagues 
at Valpo Law (particularly JoEilen Lind and Alex Geisinger) for therr msights. Thanks also to 
Michelle Dougherty, Kelly Hartzler. and Mari~~a Bracke for excellent research assiStance, and to 
the Law Library staff. The 1dea for this Artacle sprang from diSCus aons With my colleague Da\lld 
Vandercoy, an mcred1bly able law}er whose work m cnmmal defense cases has gl\leo these issues 
both depth and unmed1acy. It was his concern that his clients rece1ve fair trials b) JUnes com-
prised of a fair cross-section of their commuruhes that prompted this Article. and I thank him 
both for his uowavermg ~upport of this project and hi!> devotion to the representation of those m 
our society who most need it. 
1. See, e.g .. Enc L. Muller. Solvmg the Batson Paradox: Hannless Error, Jury Represemat1on, 
and the Sixth Amendmem. 106 YALE L.J 93 (1996); Kun Forde-Mazrua. Jural Districtmg: Sdect-
ing lmparual Juries Through Community Representation, 52 VAND L. Rev. 353 (1999); Stanton 
D. Krauss, Representmg the Community: A IAX>k at the Selecuon Proceu m Obscenity Cases and 
Capital Sentencmg. 64 r .... o. L.J. 617 (1989); Mitchell S. Zuklie, Comment, Rethmking tile Fair 
Cross-Section Reqmrl!ment, 84 CAL. L. REv. 101 (1996). 
2. There is ~orne interesting literature on the so-called "vicmage~ reqwrement-the rule em-
bodied in the Sixth Amendment that the accused enjoy) the right to be tried "by an ampartiaJ 
79 
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that gap, and to do so using communitarian and postmodern theories 
to explore the idea of community as it pertains to the composition of 
juries. 
The issues examined here are not, however, purely theoretical. 
They have grave practical importance for criminal defendants facing 
trial. Lawyers on both sides of criminal prosecutions have long tried 
to manipulate the composition of juries in an effort to obtain 
favorable results at trial. Devices like peremptory challenges and 
change of venue motions are routinely used in these efforts, and the 
strategic effects and constitutional implications of these are well-docu-
mented. But a new, subtler manipulation of the jury composition 
scheme is emerging, one that makes the theoretical issues around the 
concept of community immediate and compelling. Federal prosecu-
tors are taking control in increasing numbers of criminal prosecutions 
previously within the purview of state prosecutors. This "federaliza-
tion" of so-called street crime, notably murders and robberies, has the 
effect in most states of widening the "community'' from which jurors 
will be drawn from a county within a state to a federal district or divi-
sion encompassing several counties. A troubling second-order effect 
of this practice, then, is to de-localize juries, often diluting any signifi-
cant minority representation.3 
A concrete example illustrates the problem and will provide a case 
study for the analysis to follow. A robbery takes place in a gun store 
located in an urban area with a high minority population. During the 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have heen commilled. which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law." U.S. Co-..sr. amend. VI. See generally Steven A. 
Engel, The Public's Vicinage Right: A Conscicwional Argument, 75 N. Y.U. L. Rt:.v. 1658 (2000) 
(arguing that the publlc has a constitutional right to have criminal tnals adjudicated locally). 
Engel uses history and constitutional theory to make the case that the communi!) whtch 1S ag-
grieved by the commission of a particular crime has a paramount, constitutionally protected 
interest in being the venue for its prosecution. See generally id. He premises his argument on 
the notion that legislatures (state and federal) are properly equipped to ·'defme the v1cinagc 
community" by drawing judicial districts. /d. at 1709. He does not address the que!>tion of 
whether state or federal legislatively drawn boundaries adequately capture the community that 
criminal juries should represent, particularly m larger federal dtstricts. See also K. Winchester 
Gaines, Race, Venue and the Rodney King Case: Can Batson Stn·e the Vici11age Community?. 73 
U. Dr:.T. MERCY L. RFv. 271 (1996); Drew L. Ker!>hen. Vicinage, 29 0Kt.A. L. RFv. 803 (1976). 
Courts generally have operated on the assumption that the "community" for fair cross-section 
purposes is adequately captured by political boundanes. state or federal. See, e.g .. Davis v. War-
den, 867 F.2d 1003, 1009 (7th Cir. 1989) ("County lines or federal distnctlines do not magically 
determme the parameters of a commuruty. We believe, however. that because the deci!>10n i!> 
somewhat arbitrary. it i~ a decistOn that should be left when pos~iblc to a body authorized to 
legislate on such matters."'); United State!> v. Grisham, 63 F.3d 1074, 1079 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(though vicinage is a coru.titutional "constraint on the source of the jury ... the size of the 
vicinage was left to Congressional determination."). 
3. See mfra Part II.C. 
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course of the robbery, the gun shop owner is killed. A young African-
American man is arrested for the crime. The United States Attorney 
decides to pursue a federal prosecution, basing federal jurisdiction on 
criminal code provisions enacted by Congress under its Commerce 
Clause powers, and seeks the death penalty under federal law. Be-
cause the federal district encompasses not just the urban county, but 
also "collar" suburban counties, the jury pool from which the federal 
jury will be drawn has a very different demographic makeup from one 
that would be drawn, under state law, in a state prosecution within the 
county where the crime took place. The wider reach of the federal 
court means that the jury venire panel consists of many fewer minority 
members, and the prospect that the defendants will face an all-white, 
or nearly all-white, jury becomes much more likely.4 
In the past thirty years, the Supreme Court has been forced to wres-
tle with difficult issues of race and the jury,5 and its two strands of 
jurisprudence (one based on the fair cross-section requirement and 
the other on the equal protection clause) have proven difficult to rec-
oncile.6 The difficulty lies in the seeming inconsistency between the 
fair cross-section requirement's privileging of juror diversity so that 
differing perspectives are brought to the decisionmaking table and the 
equal protection doctrine's rejection of stereotyping as predictive of 
juror perspectives. Rather than mount another attempt to integrate 
these competing constitutional principles into a coherent doctrine, this 
article seeks to refocus the debate toward a more communitarian-
based view of the jury, using the federal versus state venire problem as 
a lens. 
The article thus proceeds in three major parts. Part II explains the 
process by which juries are assembled in federal and state courts 
under constitutional and statutory guidelines.7 The relative geo-
4. A relatively old federal venue statute requires that capital cases be tried "in the county 
where the offense was committed, where that can be done without great inconvemence." 18 
U.S.C. § 3235 (2000). The secuon has been interpreted not to gtve defendants absolute rights to 
trial m a certain county and to vest discretion in tnal courts on the convenience question. See 
Davis v. United States, 32 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1929); Brown v. United States, 257 F. 46, 48 {5th 
Cir. 1919), rev'd on other grounds, 256 U.S. 335 (1921). In any e\ent, thts venue statute does not 
affect the jury pool, which would still be determined accordmg to the district's jury selection plan 
on a district or division-wide basis, according to the vtcinage requirement of the Sixth Amend-
ment. See infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text. 
5. See Andrew D. Leipold. Constmuionalizing Jury Selection in Crimmal Cases: A Cntical 
Evaluation. 86 Gco. L.J. 945, 946-57 (1998) (describing the Supreme Court's relatively recent 
interventions into jury selection procedures using the Sixth Amendment fatr cross-section re-
quirement and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause). 
6. See generally Muller, supra note I. 
7. See infra notes 14-65 and accompanying text. 
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graphic spheres encompassed by state and federal jury pools will be 
explored, using five metropolitan areas of varying populations around 
the country8 as examples, with particular attention to the demographic 
consequences of using either federal districts or state counties to de-
fine jury venire pools by reference to the latest census data. Part III 
examines communitarian9 and postmodern theory in an effort to de-
fine the relevant "communities" from which "fair" cross-sections can 
be drawn to form politically legitimate juries. 10 In particular, the key 
postmodem precept of constructed meaning has profound implica-
tions for the work of juries: when juries as collective democratic bod-
ies give content to legal norms, they form interpretive communities.11 
What gives a community coherence such that it can legitimately agree 
on, and express through a jury, what constitutes, for example, "aggra-
vating" or "mitigating" circumstances that would warrant the imposi-
tion of a death sentence? Is that sort of coherence inherently local12 
and therefore dissipated when one moves beyond fairly small geo-
graphic boundaries? 
Finally, Part IV will synthesize the practice with the theory and con-
sider the implications of the federalization trend in criminal prosecu-
tions.13 If relatively more of our criminal law is to be, in essence, 
defined by federal as opposed to state juries, then it is essential that 
we recognize this not just as a dilution of local power (a traditional 
concern of federalism) but as an affront to the ideal of comrnunitarian 
justice embodied in the criminal jury. 
8. The five areas. randomly chosen, are Los Angeles. California; Ph1ladelphia, Penn~ylvania; 
Gary, Indiana; Detroit, Michigan; and Dallas, Texas. 
9. "Communitananism" has been de~ribed as 
a social philosophy that maintams that soc1etal formulations of the good arc both 
needed and legitimate. Communitariani!.m IS often contrasted \\ith classicallibcra~m. 
a philosophical position that holds each individual should formulate the good. Com-
murutarians examine the way shared conceptions of the good (values) are formed, 
transmitted, enforced and justified. 
Ttu: OxroRD CoMPANION TO Pm n1cs 01- nrr WoRLD 158 (Joel Krieger ed., 2d ed. 2001). 
10. See infra notes 66-123 and accompanying text. 
11. The concept of "interpre tive communities" was first articulated by the literary-legal theo-
rist Stanley Fish to describe why language somellmes seems to have embedded mcamng. See 
generally SIANLtY FtsH, Is TJU:.RE A TEXT L'l T111S CLAss?: THE AUI HORnv Of' lNTFRPRETIVE 
CoMM UNITiES (1980) and inf ra notes 111- 123 and accompanying text. Compare the notion of 
"communiues of interest" developed in Supreme Court ca~e~ on legislative districung. See 
Forde-Mazrui, St~pra note I, at 382-88. 
12. Fish argues repeatedly that it is, though not in this (jury) context. 
13. See mf ra notes 124-170 and accompanying text. 
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II. AssF\.fBLIXG FEDERAL AND STATE J uRY VENIRES 
Jury panels are assembled in both state and federal courts against a 
backdrop mosaic of constitutional,14 statutory, and administrative law. 
I thus begin my description with a short explanation of federal consti-
tutional requirements for the assembling of jury venire panels, re-
quirements that apply to all criminal jury panels in both state and 
federal courts. I then move to an examination of the statutory and 
administrative process used in federal court to assemble jury venires. 
Finally, I describe the demographic consequences of drawing juries 
from federal districts rather than state counties, using five sample met-
ropolitan areas to demonstrate the dilution effect of federal 
districting. 
A. Constitutional Requirements in the Assembly of 
Jury Venire Panels 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees 
defendants charged with crimes the right to a trial by an "impartial" 
jury.15 This guarantee has long been interpreted by the Supreme 
Court to mean that juries must be drawn from a fair cross-section of 
the community.16 Enforcing this fair cross-section requirement has 
engaged the courts in an evolving process, from early cases striking 
down overt exclusions of distinct demographic groups (primarily those 
based on gender and race) to later cases involving more subtle forms 
of discrimination. All the cases make clear, however, that the Sixth 
Amendment right to a fair cross-section applies only to the jury ve-
nire,17 not to the actual "petit" jury panel that ends up serving in any 
particular case.18 
14. For state JUTY venires, both federal and state constitutional law will control the process. 
15. U.S. Cor.S1. amend. VI. 
16. Ballard v. Umted States, 329 U.S 1H7, 191 (1946). 
17. Jury vemre panels are typically assembled by clerks of court. who first develop a "~ource 
list" for potential JUrors-often by !bing voter rolls or drivmg records-and then use some ran-
dom method to choose wh1ch persons wtll actually be called for jury duty. 
18. Su, ~.g .• Ballard, 329 U.S. at 192-93 (quotmg Thiel v S. Pac. Co .. 328 U.S. 217,220 (1946) 
(Citations omitted)): 
llus does not mean. of course. that every jul') must contam representatives of all the 
economic, social. re!Jg1ous, racial. political, and geograplucal groups of the commumty: 
frequently such complete representation would be tm~1ble. But II doe~ mean that 
prospective jurors shall be selected by court officials Without systemauc and intentional 
exclusiOn of any of these groups. 
Su also Taylor v. Louisiana. 419 U.S. 522. 538 (1975) (''[I]n holding that petit Juries must be 
drawn from a source fairly representative of the commumty we tmpose no requirement that pellt 
JUnes actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the vanous disunctive groups m 
the population.''). As to the petit JUry, the tool for incluston of prev1ously underrepresented 
groups has been the Equal Protection Clau~. See J.E.B. ' · Alabama e..\ r~L T.B., 511 U.S. 127. 
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The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has 
lso served as a check on racial discrimination in jury selection. Not 
I ng after the post-Civil War amendments to the United States Consti-
tution were ratified, a case came to the Supreme Court on the issue of 
hether an outright exclusion of African-American men from jury 
nice \iolated the new concept of "equal protection" under the law. 
In Strauder v. West Virginia, 19 the Supreme Court held that it did, a 
holding that affects both the jury venire and the petit jury.20 Later, 
the Court invoked the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth 
Amendment to strike down both laws and practices that had the effect 
of excluding African-Americans,21 daily wage-eamers,22 Latinos,23 
and women24 from jury service. 
However, the systematic exclusion of women and racial minorities 
from jury service persisted in some states well into the twentieth cen-
tury.25 The Supreme Court finally, and definitively, announced in the 
1970s that schemes requiring women to affirmatively register their de-
ire to serve as jurors2t> or that granted automatic exemptions to 
y,omen summoned to serve27 violate the fair cross-section 
requirement. 
In Taylor v. Louisiana,211 the Supreme Court identified three pur-
poses served by the fair cross-section requirement: " [1] guard(ing] 
against the exercise of arbitrary power [and invoking] the common-
sense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous 
or mistaken prosecutor ... [;] (2] [preserving] public confidence in the 
fai rness of the criminal justice system [;and] (3] sharing . .. the admin-
146 (1994) (fJatson rule extended to peremptory challenges based on gender); Batson v. Ken-
tucly. 476 U.S. 79, 1\9 (19&i) (Equal protectron v1olated by use of peremptory challenges to 
exclude pro~pectJvc juror\ solely on .Iecount of their race.). 
19 100 u.s. 303 (1879). 
20. See Holland v. llhnois, 493 U.S. 474.479 (1990) ("(T]he Fourteenth Amendment's prohibi-
hon of unequal treatment tn general and racial d&rimination m parllcular .... therefore bas 
equal application at the petit jul') and the vemre stages .... "). 
21. See generally Norm v. Alabama. 294 U.S. 5!!7 (1935). 
22. See xenerally Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) 
23. See generally Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954). 
24 See gmeral/y Ballard v. Umted States. 329 U.S. 187 (1946). 
25. For an argument that a correlation exists between the mcreasmg mclus1veness of "~~.Omen 
and minorities on juncs and increasing hmits on jury power on the civil s1de of the docket. see 
Laura Gaston Dooley. Our Juriel, Our Selvel. The Power, Perception, and Politic.r of the Ci~·il 
Jury. HO CoKNEU. L RE\-. 325 (1995). 
26. See Iii) lor\. Lou1s1ana, 419 U.S. 522.538 (1975) (strikmg Lows1ana's constitutional provi-
SIOn requ1ring women lO file written dcclarat1oru. to serve on JUries). 
27. See Duren v. M1sso uri. 439 U.S. 357. 370 ( 1979) (stnlong Missouri pract1ce of grantmg 
women automatic exemptions from JUry service). 
28. 419 u.s 522 (1975). 
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istration of justice [as] a phase of civic responsibility."29 The Court 
has extolled these functions as clear justifications for striking down 
rules that overtly exclude racial minorities and women.30 Neverthe-
less, the Court has refused to find either fair cross-section or equal 
protection violations in some cases in which statistical data demon-
strated gross underrepresentation of racial minorities in the jury pool. 
Brown v. Allen31 involved the Alabama trial of an African-American 
man for rape, which resulted in a conviction and death sentence. The 
Supreme Court held that despite the gross underrepresentation of Af-
rican-Americans in the jury pool,32 no Sixth Amendment violation ex-
isted given the efforts the county had made to increase the number of 
African-Americans in the jury pool.31 Some twelve years later, the 
Supreme Court revisited the problem of race and juries in Alabama. 
In Swain v. Aiabama,34 the Court declared that "a defendant in a 
criminal case is not constitutionally entitled to demand a proportion-
ate number of his race on the jury which tries him nor on the venire or 
jury roll from which petit jurors are drawn."3-~ Absent a showing of 
purposeful discrimination against an identifiable group, the Court 
held, a disparity of as much as 10% between a group's representation 
in the jury pool and its representation in the general population does 
not amount to an equal protection problem.36 
29. /d. at 530-31 (emphasis added) (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac .• 321! U.S. 217, 227 ( 1946) (Frank-
furte r. J . diS~cnttng)). 
30. Su Lockhart" McCree. 476 t .S ,62 (1986). While refusmg to recogruze class of pro-
~pccuve JUrOr) opposed to the death penally a) a .. disttncuve group" for purposes of the fair 
cross-scct1on requirement, the Court noted that excludmg 
such group~ as blacks. . women, ... and Mex1can-Amencans ... from JUry service 
clearly contravene) d) all three of the aforementioned purposes for the fair<ross-sectJon 
reqwrcment. Because these group~ [were) excluded for reason completely unrelated 
to the ab1ht) of members of the group to serve as JUrors in a particular case. the exclu-
SIOn ra1se!s] at lea~t the possib1hty that the compos1tion of junes would be arbiiianly 
skewed m ~uch a '>'ay as to deny crimmal defendants the benefit of the common-sense 
Judgment of the commumty. 
ld at 175. 
31. 344 u.s. 443 (1953). 
32. The source list. comprised of all county property and poll taxpa)'er.. included 16% Afri-
can-Amencans, as compared to 33.5'~<o AfriCan-Americans over twenty-one years of age tn the 
general population. ld. at 467~. Of the sixty potential JUrors called for the defendant's case. 
five were Afncan-Amcncan. /d. at 469. 
33. The county had elmunated poll taxes. nummum property ownership requ1rements, and the 
requirement that a ll taxe) be paid for chg~bility for jury -.en1ce. ld a t 470. 
34. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). overruled m part by Batson\. Kentucky. 476 U.S 79 (1986). 
35. /d. a t 208. 
36. /d. at 208-00. For an explanauon of the statc.ucal defic1cnc1es m the Supreme Court'~ 
analysis of the data presented in Swain. see Mark McGillis, J11ry Venires: Eluninating the D~r­
crimination factor by Usmg a Statistical Approach, 3 How. SCROlL 17.31-33 (1995). Swam also 
held that the pro~cutor's usc of peremptory challenges to rcmo\e prospective African-Amen-
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The Supreme Court has subsequently settled on a three-part analy-
sis to ascertain whether a violation of the fair cross-section require-
ment has occurred: 
the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded 
is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation 
of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and 
reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the commu-
nity; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic ex-
clusion of the group in the jury-selection process.37 
Lower courts have read the 10% criterion of Swain into the second 
prong of the Duren analysis.38 In United States v. Phillips,39 for exam-
ple, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held 
that a jury venire panel wholly devoid of African-Americans and His-
panics was not a Sixth Amendment problem when African-Americans 
and Hispanics comprised only 6.1% of the population.40 Thus, in any 
district or division that lacks a 10% minority population, a Sixth 
Amendment fair cross-section claim could never be mounted , even in 
the complete absence of minority representation in the jury pool.41 
Defining the relevant scope of the community from which a fair 
cross-section will be drawn, therefore, matters critically to the possi-
bility of genuine diversity on the jury. If minority communities tend 
to be concentrated in particular geographic areas,42 smaller vicinage 
districts are much more likely to capture a critical mass of minority 
can jurors did not VJolate the Equal Protection Clause. 3RO U.S. at 226-27. Thi~ aspect of Swain 
was overruled by the Court's decision in Batson, which now requires race-neutral use of peremp-
tory challenges. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986). 
37. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). 
38. Swain was an equal protection case, but the test to state an equal protection claim for 
minority underrepre~ntatton 10 the jury pool generally nurrors the fau cross-section test. !d. at 
371 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The difference is that equal protection claims require a showing 
of intentional discnm10ation. !d. 
39. 239 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 2001). 
40. !d. at 841-42. The trial had taken place in the federal court m South Bend, Indiana. 
41. Th1s IS known as the "absolute d!spanty" method for measuring underrepresentation, by 
wh1ch "the percentage of representallon of a d1stmct group on the venire 1s subtracted from the 
percentage of representation of the group 10 the population as a whole." Ted M. Eades, R~isit­
rng the Jury Syjtem m Texas: A Study of the Jury Pool m Dallas County, 54 SMU L. REv. 1813, 
1822 (2001). Though other statistical methods are used by some courts, most use the 10% floor 
in both equal protection cases (whJch requ11e a ~bowing of intentional discrimination) and fair 
cross-section cases. /d. ot 1824. Su also Umted States v. Grisham, 63 F.3d 1074, 1079 (11th Cir. 
1995) (using absolute disparity analysis with the 10% rule): United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 
231, 240-43 (3d Cir. 2001) (using absolute disparity analysis but Without explicit usc of the 10% 
rule): Umted States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 656 (2d Cir. 1996) (using absolute disparity analysis, 
though notmg 1ts prev1ous refusal to use absolute numbers in a case where evidence existed that 
exclu~10n of mmoriues from Jury pool was not bemgn). 
42. Set generally Nancy A. Denton, The Persistence of Segregation: Links Between Residential 
Segregatton and School Segregatton, 80 M~. L. RE\ . 795 (1996). 
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presence. And this critical mass is essential to even trigger a fair 
cross-section analysis under the Sixth Amendment. 
B. Assembling the Jury Venire in Federal Court 
With the constitutional backdrop explained above, we now turn to a 
description of the process by which jury venire panels are actually as-
sembled in federal courts. Because a fairly elaborate statutory scheme 
governs the process, there is some degree of uniformity amongst fed-
eral districts around the country with regard to jury selection. The 
uniformity is imperfect, though, because the statute itself allows some 
flexibility for local federal district courts in developing their jury selec-
tion plans to fit local conditions. 
Before 1968, federal courts often used a "key man" method of as-
sembling a pool of prospective jurors.43 This method utilized well-
connected individuals or organizations to suggest citizens who, be-
cause of their esteem within the community, would make good jurors. 
The obviously exclusionary character of this method finally led both 
to a court decision striking it down44 and to a new statute designed to 
produce a fairer cross-section of the community. The federal Jury Se-
lection Act,45 enacted by Congress in 1968, was designed to prevent 
discrimination in jury service on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, 
national origin, or economic status.46 
The statute requires federal district courts to use lists of registered 
or actual voters as their source lists or, if necessary "to foster the pol-
icy and protect the rights" identified by the statute, use some "other 
source or sources of names."47 Some federal districts use district-wide 
plans to draw jurors; others adopt separate plans for divisions or com-
bination of divisions within the judicial district.48 The statute specifi-
cally requires that the procedures contained in the jury plans of each 
division or district "shall be designed to ensure the random selection 
of a fair cross section of the persons residing in the community in the 
district or division wherein the court convenes."49 Thus, the statute 
43. J ACK FR1EDEN'I1iAL Fl AL, C1v1L PROCEDURE§ 11.10 (3d ed. 1999). 
44. See Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34. 44 (5lh Cir. 1966). 
45. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1871 (2000). 
46. See id. § 1862. 
47. ld. § 1863(b)(2). 
48. See id. § 1863(a) ("Separate plans may be adopted for each division or combination of 
divisions within a judicial district.''). 
49. !d. § 1863(b)(3) (emphasis added). Further, the plan 
shall ensure that names of persons residing in each of lhe counties, parishes, or similar 
political subdivisions within the judicial district or division are placed in a master jury 
wheel; and shall ensure that each county. parish, or similar political subdivision within 
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explicitly defines the community from which a fair cross-section of ju-
rors is to be drawn as the entire federal district or division. In most 
federal districts, this will be a multi-county area.50 
C. The Demographic Consequences of Assembling Juries in 
Federal Versus State Cotms 
This section examines five sample metropolitan areas in an effort to 
determine the demographic consequences of assembling juries in the 
state courts, organized by county, as opposed to the federal courts, 
organized by federal districts. In each of the five samples, metropoli-
tan areas are essentially comprised of a city that constitutes the major 
population center of a county surrounded by suburban collar counties. 
Census data demonstrate that the minority population is higher in the 
urban county than it is in the suburban collar counties.";' Thus, the 
federal districts that are drawn to include the collar counties will di-
lute the minority representation in the jury pool for federal casesY 
For example, Indiana is divided into two federal judicial districts, 
northern and southern.53 The northern district is then subdivided into 
three divisions, one of which is the Hammond Division. ";4 Lake 
County, in the Hammond division, is where the city of Gary is located, 
and has a large minority population. The surrounding counties are 
overwhelmingly white. Thus, moving beyond Lake Count} to draw a 
ld 
the district or dtVlSton ts bub~tantially proportionally represented in the ma\tcr jury 
wheel for that JUdicial d~tnct, dtvis1on. or combtnallon of d11.1sions. 
50. Su. t.g., mfra Part II.C (dc";Cnbtng demographics of federal districts in five ~ample metro· 
pohtan areas). Set aLm Rose Jade. Ortgon Jury Pool.r: Who Art Tlrtst Peoplt and Whtre Did 
fhty Comt From?, OR. ST. B. BuLL, May 1999. at 19. 19. Ste"e Maim. Litigating Intellectual 
Proptrty Dtsputts m Ttxas Statt Coun, 12 TL.x. INfli.L. PRor. LJ. 473. 496 (2004) ("Cases to 
Teus state court draw ventre from the county m 'Ahich the court M~. federal cour~. on the other 
hand, draw Jurors from multtple countte~ 'Attlun that court'b tbstnct and divibion."), Robert B. 
Hemley & Carol L. Shea, DtSptllmg Mytlw The Difftrencts Btrween Fetltml and State Coun. 
\ 1 BJ .. Winter 21X13-2004, at 31, 31. ("The JUry pool for federal~~ dra") from multtple 
counucs. "). 
51 When using census data to detenrune representatt~ene» on jul) venire panel~. the anal}· 
sis ts necessarily imprecise becaube the cen~ub doe~ not measure the JUry·eligJhlc population. 
Thus. courts are forced to do a crude compario;on between the pcr.;~ntagc of a minority group in 
the populattoo base aod the percentage of that group tn the JUry pool. .<itt Eades, supra note 41 , 
at 1823 (Though some courts have objected, the Supreme Court uq:s general ccn~ub data Ill jury 
representativeness cases, and census informatton "IS the most accurate. readtly available ~ource 
of data."). 
52. See infra Appendu A for a graphic representation or the censu data. 
53. 28 u.s.c. § 9.t (2000). 
54. /d. The Hammond O.v~ton IS compnsed of the counttes of B~nton. Carroll, Jasper. Lake. 
Newton. Porter. Tippecanoe. Warren. and Wtute. It/ The Hammond D1v1sion holds court in 
Hammond, with JUrors drawn from Lake and Porter countte . and in L..faycttc, with juror' 
drawn from the other counties. 
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jury pool for federal court cases inevitably dilutes minority represen-
tation. While the African-American population of Lake County is 
25.3%, blacks are only 19.7% of the Hammond division because of 
the addition of virtually all-white Porter County.55 Moreover, the di-
lution effect may be exacerbated by intra-district transfers, which are 
not a fair cross-section problem because the statute defines the com-
munity by district or division.56 When a case is transferred from the 
Hammond division, for example, to the South Bend division, juries 
will be drawn from a division in which only 6.1% of the population is 
African-American. 57 
The demographics in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania area are even 
starker. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which is the federal dis-
trict encompassing the city of Philadelphia and its namesake county, is 
comprised of eight additional collar counties. The federal court uses 
voter registration lists to assemble its jury pool; the state courts in 
Philadelphia County use both voter and drivers' registration lists.58 
The percentage of African-Americans in Philadelphia County is 
43.2%;59 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, that number drops to 
16.8%.60 
A similar phenomenon exists in the Detroit metropolitan area. The 
city is located in Wayne County, which bas a 42.2% black popula-
55. See U.S. Cen~us Bureau, Profile of General Demographic Characteristics: 2()()(}, tbl. DP-1 
(Porter County, Ind.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/IN/05018127.pdf [hereinafter 
tbl. DP-1 (county, state)]. 
56. See Davis v. Warden, 867 F.2d 1003, 1008 (7tb Cir. 1989). 
Accordmg to the Supreme Court, the sixth amendment entitles a defendant to a jury 
drawn from the federal district in which the crime was committed, although the jury 
may be drawn from a dtvision of the district rather than the entire district. Lower 
courts have held therefore that a jury selection system satisfies the sixth amendment if 
the jury is selected from either the entire district or a division of that district. 
/d. (internal citations omitted). 
57. See United States v. Phillip~. 239 F.3d 829, 841-42 (7th Cir. 2001 ). 
58. See 42 PA. Cor-:s. SlAT. § 452l(a) (2003). 
59. Thl. DP-l (Philadelphia County, Pa.) supra note 55, available at http://ccnstats.census.gov/ 
da ta/PA/05Q.t21 o l.pd r. 
60. The percentage of Afncan-Americans in the federal distnct was calculated using the cen-
SUl> data from each of its constituent counties (Berks. Bucks. Chester, Delaware, Lancaster, Le-
high, Montgomery. Northampton, and Philadelphia counties). Thl. DP-1 (Berks County, Pa.), 
supra note 55, available at http://ccnstats.census.gov/data/PA/050420ll.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Bucks 
County. Pa.), available at http://censtats.ccn~us.govfdata/PA/05042017.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Che~ter 
County, Pa.), available at http://censtats.cen~us.gov/dataJPA/05042029.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Delaware 
County, Pa.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/PA/05042045.pdf: tbl. DP-1 (Lancaster 
County, Pa.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/PA/0504207l.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Lehigh 
County. Pa.). available at http://censtats.ccnsus.gov/data/PA/05042077.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Montgom-
ery County. Pa.), aHJilable at http://censtats.census.gov/data/PA/0504209l.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (North-
ampton County. Pa.). available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/PA/05042095.pdf; tbl. DP-1 
(Philadelphia County, Pa.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/PA/05042101.pdf. 
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tion.61 The Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, encom-
passes Wayne County along with eight other counties, yielding a 
21.5% overall African-American population.62 Significantly, the State 
of Michigan does not have a death penalty.63 Thus, the federalization 
of murder trials in Michigan makes the death penalty available at the 
same time that it dilutes minority representation in the jury pool. 
In the Los Angeles and Dallas areas, the story is an interesting re-
flection of the changing demographics in America generally. In both 
metro areas, the Hispanic population is larger than other minority 
groups.64 And in both areas, the proportion of both Hispanic and Af-
rican-American populations gets diluted by federal divisions that in-
clude suburban counties along with the county in which each city is 
located, though the disparity is not as great as in Philadelphia or 
Detroit.65 
61. See tbl. DP·I (Wayne County, Mich.), supra note 55. available ar http:/fcenstats.census.gov/ 
data/Mll05026163.pdf. 
62. This percentage was calculated using the data from counties within the Eastern D1strict of 
Michigan, Southern Division (Jackson, Lenawee, Macomb, Monroe, Oakland, St. Clair, Sanilac, 
Washetenaw. Wayne). See tbl. DP-1 (Jackson County, Mich.), available at http:/fccn~tats.ccnsus. 
gov/data!Ml/05026075.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Lenaweee County, Mich.). available ar http://ccnstats.cen-
sus.gov/data/M1/05026091.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Macomb County, ~ich.), available at http://censtats. 
census.gov/data!MI/05026099.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Monroe County, Mich.), available ar http://censtats. 
ccnsus.gov/data/MI/05026115.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Oakland County. Mich.), available ar http://censtats. 
census.gov/data!MIJ05026125.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (St. Clair County, Mich.). available ar http://censtats. 
census.gov/data/MIJ05026147.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Sanilac County, Mich.), avatlable at http://censtats. 
census.gov/data/MI/0502615l.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Washtenaw County, Mich.), available ar http://cen-
stats.census.gov/data/M1/0502616l.pdf tbl. DP-1 (Wayne County. Mich.). available at http://cen-
stats.census.gov/data/MIJ05026163.pdf. 
63. MtcH. CaNsT. art. IV, § 46 {declaring that .. [n)o law shall be enacted providmg for the 
penalty of death"). 
64. See tbl. DP-1, (Los Angeles County, Cal.), supra note 59, available ar http://censtats.cen-
sus.gov/data/CA/05006037.pdf (showing 44.6% "Hispanic or Latino (of any race)"); tbl. DP-1 
(Dallas, Tex.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data!fX/05048113.pdf (sho\\ing 29.9% 
"Hispanic or Latino (of any race)"). 
65. In California, the proportion of African-Americans in Los Angeles County is 9.8% versus 
8.8% in the Central federal district, western division. which encompasses Los Angeles, San Luis 
Obispo, Santa Barbara, and Ventura Counties. Tbl. DP-1 (Los Angeles Count), Cal.). supra 
note 55, available ar http://censtats.census.gov/data!CAI05006037.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (San Luis Obispo 
County, Cal.). available at http://censtats.ccnsus.gov/data/CA105006079.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Santa 
Barbara County, Cal.), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/CN05006083.pdf; tbl. DP-1 
(Ventura County, Cal.), available at bttp://censtats.census.gov/data/CNOS006lll.pdf. The pro-
portion of Hispanics in Los Angeles County is 44.6%. as opposed to 42.8% in the federal divi-
sion. Tbl. DP-1 (Los Angeles County, Cal.). avatlable at http://censtats.census.gov/data/CAJ 
05006037.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (San Luis Obispo County, Cal.), avatlable at http://censtats.census.gov/ 
data/CA/05006079.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Santa Barbara County, Cal.), avatlable at http://censta~.cen­
sus.gov/data/CN05006083.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Ventura County, Cal.), available at http://censtats.cen-
sus.gov/data!CN05006lll.pdf. In Texas, Dallas County bas 20.3% African-Americans and 
29.9% Hispanics as opposed to the Northern District of Texas. Dallas Division, which has 18.1% 
African-Americans and 26.9% Hispanics because it incorporates six adduional counties. Tbl. 
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III. DFrrNING TllF RELEVAI'<'T COMMUNITY: 
THEORETICAL PERSPECflVES 
The demonstration that the demographic makeup of the jury venire 
pool will vary in state and federal court, at least in the five sample 
districts examined, pushes toward a fundamental question: what is the 
relevant community from which the "fair cross-section'' of jurors 
should be drawn? Both state counties and federal districts are politi-
cal subdivisions. drawn by historical accidents or political expedien-
cies. But does either geographically-defined space capture the sort of 
coherence that could fairly be said to constitute community in a more 
meaningful sense of the word? I look now to two distinctive theoreti-
cal schools in an effort to give content to the concept of "community" 
as used in the fair cross-section context. The first is the comrnunitar-
ian movement, whose agenda has been most famously articulated by 
sociologist Amitai Etzioni.66 The second is the postmodem linguistic 
theory of "interpretive communities," an idea championed by literary 
and legal scholar Stanley Fish.67 
A. Communitarian Theory 
In his book, The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a 
Democracic Society,68 Arnitai Etzioni69 makes a powerful case for the 
importance of a core of shared values70 in defining moral order. This 
"core of shared values" enables a community "to formulate specific 
public policies .. . [by providing] criteria for settling differences in a 
DP-1 (DaUa . Tex.). u~·atlablt• at hup://censtats.censu~.gov/datafTXJ05048113.pdf: tbl. DP-1 (Ellis 
County, Telt .). u~·ailabl~ at hllp://censtats.cen us.govtdata!TXJ05048139.pdf: tbl. DP-1 (Hunt 
County, Telt .), amtlnbl~ at hllp:licc:nstats.census.govfdatafrXJ05041S23l.pdf, tbl. DP-1 (Johnson 
County, Telt,), a~·ai/abl~ at hup: lcenstabcensus.gov/data!TXJ0~8251.pdf. tbl. DP-1 (Kaufman 
County. Tex.). a~·atlab/~ at hup:. 'censtats.census.govfdatafTX 0504h'257.pdf; tbl. DP-1 (Navarro 
County. Telt.), a~·uiktbl~ at hup:~ 1censtats.ceru.us.go.,.fdatarrxJ05048349.pdf; tbl DP-1 (Rockwall 
Count]. Tex.). a~·aiktble at http:•'censtats.census.go.,.fdataffX/0504 397.pdf. 
66. Sec mfra note 68-74, 106-110. 150. 15-4 and accompanymg text. 
67 Stt lllpru notes 11- 12 and infra notes 111- 123 and accompanytng text. 
68. A.'cn 11.1 F. rZIONI , Tun Nr"' GoLD~ .• '~ Ruu::: CoMMUNn v A 'ID MoRALITY IN A DEMO· 
<;RA IIC" Son~o:n (1996). 
69. Et.L:ioni. Univcrs1ty Profe!>sor at George Wash.mgton Umve~1ty, is the foundmg pres1dcot 
of the Communitarian !'<ctworlc and the editor of I ht R~sponstv~ C<Jmmumty, a wtde1y-dislrib-
uted new,letter. He: is one of the prem1er vo1ces in the communilanan movement. 
70. EUIONI. supra note 68. at 85. 
51turetl values are \.alue to "'h1ch most membe~ of the society are committed (albett 
not ncce~~arily to the: same extent). Shared value~ differ profoundly from agrud posi-
tions. "'hich are the results of some procedure, c;uch as negouated contracts or arbttra-
tion. and arc reached on practical or tactical grounds-an accommodauon by 
individuab "'ho have different values. 
It/. at 85-M. 
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principled rather than an ad hoc or interest-based manner."71 The 
problem, of course, is the tension inherent in a pluralistic society such 
as the United States between these "shared core values" and the no-
tion of a liberal state fueled by individual freedoms. Much of Et-
zioni's book is devoted to the ongoing debates between liberals and 
communitarians as to the shifting contours of individual freedom and 
autonomy in contraposition to the concept of the common good. 
Moreover, communitarian thinkers make "clear that communal values 
must be judged by external and overriding criteria, based on shared 
human experience."72 But rather than focusing on the imposition of 
values on some pre-existing group (geographical or otherwise) of peo-
ple, communitarian theory posits that the values themselves actually 
help to define the community.73 Thus, there is always a complex 
symbiotic interplay between any moral decisionmaker, including a ju-
ror, and her community: the community shapes her values just as her 
values shape her community.74 
At this point one confronts the problem of levels of generality. If 
values rather than geography are a better determinant of community, 
then at what level of specificity should the values be articulated? 
Michael J. Perry, after affirming that "moral deliberation requires 
community"75 (in the context of constitutional interpretation) argues 
that there exists a national "judging community" at the level of gener-
ally shared ideals like freedom of speech and religion, due process of 
law and equal protection.76 Because those ideals are by nature "un-
derdeterminate,"77 they are directly useful in situations that test the 
core of the principle of each71~ and indirectly useful as tools to mediate 
consensus and dissensus.'9 But when decisionmakers are faced with 
the task of answering a particular question, as jurors in criminal trials 
always are, this broad notion of community may well break down. As 
71. /d. a t 87. 
72. See AMTTAI El7.lor-"1, Tm: SPitol OF CoMMt.:Nirv: R 1mrrs, Rlo~I'ONsmn.mES, AND n iP 
CoMMUNITA RlAN A OENDA 255 (1993). 
73. "The starling point, typica lly, is shared values, not individual choices o r formulations of 
the good .'' ETZIOSI. supra note 68, a t 93. 
74. Erz.J0:-11, supra note 72, a t 31 (M[W)e find re inforcement for our moral inclm at•ons and 
provide re inforcement to o ur fe llow human bemgs, through the community."). 
75. M K"I!AEL J. PERRY, M oRAu TY. Pm.mc-s, AND L Aw : A B KENlENNTAt Es~AY 157 (1988). 
76. /d. at 154. 
n. !d. at 155. 
78. /d. a t 155-56. For example, the re wo uld likely be "virtual consensus" as to whether the 
government could compel allegiance to a particular religiOn. /d. a t 155. 
79. Jd. at 156. For example, the shared idea l would give decisionmaker~ a point of reference 
to decide whether a particula r policy \iOla tes the core pnnciple. PrRRY, supra note 75, a t 158. 
Perry argues tha t constitutional d iscourse, in no noriginafut constitutional adjudicatio n. 1S "at us 
idealized best, ... the moral discour~e of Lhe consti tuuonal community." !d. at 158. 
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jurors struggle with difficult moral decisionmaking (constrained only 
loosely by the judge's instructions on the relevant law), the relevant 
communities that shape the values brought to the deliberation table 
cannot be so broadly defined.8o 
Indeed, communitarianism has been criticized for its failure to de-
fine what constitutes a community for the purpose of deliberating 
moral or societal questions.81 Modern life is organized such that most 
people identify with many more than one community.82 Daniel Bell 
describes the communities that matter for moral deliberation as those 
that constitute identity, and then proposes criteria "for distinguishing 
constitlllive communities from other forms of association, contingent 
attachments, fleeting 'facts' about oneself, and so on."83 Significantly, 
constitutive communities are revealed by their members' self-defini-
tion and are aspects of their identities that "can't be shed like mem-
bership of a voluntary association. "84 And the values of those 
constitutive communities inform, in a way that is both subtle and 
sometimes dimly perceived even by the member herself, every act of 
moral deliberation.85 Bell identifies three kinds of constitutive com-
munities: communities of place, of memory (that is, a shared history), 
80. '"[WJhich commumty ~~appealed to for the 10tcrsubjective cntena or grounds o f 
JUdgment. ~mcc the latter Mil vary as o ne vanes the commuruty appealed to . 
[W)bere alleg1ances conllict, 11 IS not decided in advance which community will supply 
the ba IS of judgment. Does my commitment to a part1cular people outwe1gh, or IS 11 
out\\e1ghcd by, my comnutmentto' some other group? ' (I]t [i~ not] immediately appar-
ent to whom the JUdgment IS addre~d: a community o f the past or one proJected 10to 
the future: a panieular national community or a commumty of natio ns; a uny C'lrele or 
asc;ociate~ or uruversal mankind . . . Thus, the clatm-Judgment implles JUdgmg com-
munity-give rise to the question: which commumty'!'" 
~RRY, sr1pra note 75, at 157-58 (quotmg D . TRACY, Pu:RALrrv AND AMBIGUITY 142-43. 146 
( 191\7)) (passages rearranged). 
Rl. See DANU:.L Bn1. C'OM'1lJNIIARIAN1SM AND ll'l> CRmcs 91 (1993) ("[E]veryone knows 
that commurutarians place special emphasis upon communal life, but few have a clear grasp of 
what sort of community we arc to value."). Bell's book IS wntten in the fo rm of a two-character 
play. 10 the manner of the movie My Dinner with Andre. Both characters are graduate philoso-
phy students; over dinner and wine in a Paris restaurant. the character Anne descnbes her doc-
toral thesis, which IS a defense of communitarianism, agatDSL the character Philip's various 
crit iques. 
82. German sociologist Ferdmand Tonnies. in the mnctcenth century, descnbed what be 
called gemttrucllaft as an ideal or a local commuruty that IS stauc, orderly, and mtimate 111 con-
traM to ge.fellscllaft, the modem large-scale sOC'Iety of individuals who form assoc1a11ons only for 
mstrumental reasons. See generally FERDINAND TONNIES, C0'-1-.tl -..rrv AND Socu: 1 v (Charles 
P l.oom1s trans., Harper & Row 1963) (1887); see also Btu, ~upra note 81, at 90-91. Modem 
commumtarian thinkers reject such a stnct dichotomy, recognizing tha t it is po..sible for people 
to function in our modern large-scale SOC'Iery and still be part of constituuve commumues. /d. at 
91 
H3. ld at 94 
K4. /d. at 95. 
HS. Set td. a t 103. 
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and of ''face to face personal interaction governed by sentiments of 
trust, co-operation, and altruism."86 Thus, the work of moral decision-
making, which is the key task performed by juries, is informed by the 
jurors' constitutive communities-defined geographically, by shared 
histories, and, most significantly, by the sort of face-to-face personal 
interactions that demand both value expression and accountability.87 
This suggests that relatively smaller community boundaries, where re-
peated interpersonal interactions are more likely to take place, better 
capture the idea of community that would most matter for moral deci-
sionmaking, including that done by juries. 
The idea that local communities have intrinsic value that is endan-
gered by modern industrial and transient societal trends is not new. 
Early in the twentieth century, Progressive philosopher John Dewey 
described the corrupting influence of technology on the preexisting 
local communities of the day, noting that "the machine age in devel-
oping the Great Society has invaded and partially disintegrated the 
small communities of former times without generating a Great Com-
munity."88 Dewey worried that the loss of those smaller communities 
would portend a diminishment of American democracy, because he 
considered "genuine community life"-that is, a common identity-to 
be necessary to effective self-governance.ts9 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, Robert D. Putnam famously 
described a similar phenomenon-that is, a loss of what he calls ··so-
cial capital"-as "bowling alone."cx1 In his book, Bowling Alone, Put-
/d. 
(T]hree cnteria (are) employed to dJStinguish 'con~tnuuve commumues· from contm-
gent attachments .... One ~houJd start "'tth ho~>. 11 ts that people in fact define them-
selves, i.e. how they answer the question 'who are you? Next . .. a con~titutive 
community provtdcs a largely background way of meaningful thinking, acting, and 
judging. The last criterion [IS that] one lo~cs a commitment to a constituti\'e communtty 
at the price of being thrown mto a state of severe disorientauon where one is unable to 
take a stand on many thmgs of significance. 
86. BELL, supra note 81. at 185. 
87. /d. 
88. Jo uN D EWEY, Tmo P UBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1926). reprinted in 2 Ttm LATER WoRAS 
or JoHN D cWEv,l925-1953, at314 (JoAnn Boydston ed., 1984). quoted in MtcHAEI J. SAr-DEL. 
D£.',10CRAC"Y's 0Jscor-TENI. A.""'-KICA ts SrARC"H or- A Pt •ouc PHILOSOPHY 20!1 (1996). 
89. Id. 
90. R O BERT D . PtJTNAM, BowLL-.jQ Al.osn: Tur; Cmt.APS!i A'ID REviVAL 0 1 AMERICAN 
CoMMl..'lllY (2000). 
(S]ocial capttaJ refers to connections among indtvtduals-!><Xtal networks and the 
norms of reCJprocit) and trustworthmess that anse from them. In that c;cnc;c social 
capital ~closely related to what some have called "cMe VIrtue." The difference is that 
"sOCial capttal" calls attenuon to the fact that CIVIC vtrtue •~ most powerful ~hen em-
bedded in a dense network of reciprocal <;OCtal relations. 
/d. at 19. 
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nam describes the waning participation of Americans in both formal 
and informal social institutions, using the decline of league bowling as 
a symbolic example.91 While the general theme of Putnam's book is 
that Americans desperately need to recapture a sense of community,92 
he pointedly avoids nostalgic visions of a past "golden age" by noting 
both that social capital can have seriously negative externalities for 
those outside the community93 and that debates over the loss of com-
munity are nothing new in American intellectual life.94 Indeed, Put-
nam's thesis is not that community bonds have been in steady decline, 
but that the story of American civic engagement is one of both "col-
lapse and renewal. "95 
Putnam's book is empirically based on the study of a rich collection 
of survey data, rendering insights that have at least two important im-
plications for our project of defining community in the context of the 
fair cross-section requirement. First, the data demonstrate that the 
size of the community makes a difference in terms of civic engage-
ment.% Second, there is apparently a generational shift in the way 
that the concept of community is understood by Americans.97 
When-early Progressive thinkers worried over the loss of commu-
nity, they in part manifested a privileging of the small town over what 
was described (often quite accurately) as urban squalor.98 Dewey and 
others believed that the connectedness of relationships in smaller 
communities led to a better quality of democracy.99 Putnam's study of 
recent data seems to bear out the early reformers' intuition that the 
91. /d. at 111-13. 
92. See, e.g., id. at 28 ("[W]e Americans need to reconnect with one another. That is the 
simple argument of this book."). 
93. Putnam notes that like other forms of capital, social capital "can be directed toward ma-
levolent, antisocial purposes .... Therefore it is important to ask how the positive consequences 
of social capital-mutual support, cooperation. trust. institutional effectiveness-can be maxi-
mized and the negative manifestations-sectarianism. ethnocentrism. corruption-minimized." 
/d. at 22. 
94. "Debates about the waxmg and waning of 'commuruty' have been endem1c for at least two 
centuries .... We seem perennially tempted to contrast our tawdry todays with past golden 
ages." /d. at 24. 
95. PuTNA.'-'1, supra note 90, at 25. 
96. !d. at 119. 
97. /d. at 274-75. 
98. /d. at 378-79. 
99. /d. at 377-80. These communitanan Progressives were not necessarily pe~simiStic about 
the possibility of civic engagement in larger settings, however: " As historian Quandt describes 
the optimistic outlook of these reformers, 'The easy sense of belonging. the similarity of expen-
ence, and the ethic of participation rrught be more e~ily mamtained in the small locality than 
anywhere else, but this did not preclude their cultivation in different soil.' .. ld. at 380 (quoting 
JE.A."~ Q uAND I, FROM THr S'-'!ALL T owr- TO THE GREAT CoMMt'Nrrv: THE SociAL THOUGHT 
Or PROGRESSivr INTELLECTUALS 10 (1970)). 
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size of the community makes a difference in civic engagement: "for-
mal volunteering, working on community projects, informal helping 
behavior (like coming to the aid of a stranger), charitable giving, and 
perhaps blood donation are all more common in small towns than in 
big cities." too This supports the common-sense intuition that the 
smaller the community, the more cohesive its ties, and, presumably, its 
values-or, conversely, that as community boundaries are drawn more 
broadly. values are less likely to be shared. 
A second important in ight of Putnam's study shows a generational 
divide on civic engagement. He found that people born before 1946 
were "nearly twice as likely to feel a sense of belonging to their neigh-
borhood, to their church, to their local community, and to the various 
groups and organizations to which they belong" as Generation X'ers 
born after 1964.tot Interestingly, though both groups were intimately 
tied to their families and friends, the younger generation was mark-
edly less engaged with their local communities.1o2 Putnam struggles 
with possible explanations for the generational difference, noting the 
near-impossibility of sorting cause from effect in this complicated con-
text.103 Without reaching any definite conclusion, Putnam is dismis-
sive of the possibility that the rise of "big government" is somehow a 
causative factor in the decline in civic engagement.104 But in the par-
ticular context of the jury, it is worth exploring the possibility that as 
the jury pool widens, the potential for genuine community input into 
jury decisionmaking declines. For as the '"community'' represented by 
the jury is enlarged, the probability of cohesive values that might bind 
jurors together is lessened. Thus, the enlargement of the jury pool (by 
federalizing) has the effect of diluting community values. This, in 
tum, may well produce the second-order effect of rendering public 
sentiment that is at best dismissive of, and at worst disdainful of. jury 
service. 
This is not to say that the only places in which community-wide val-
ues can be cultivated must, necessarily, have small populations. Soci-
ologist Herbert Gans has described "urban villages" within large cities 
like Boston and New York, where people of various ethnic groups live 
together, know each other and their local merchants, and look out for 
100. PliTNAM, ~upra nott: 90. at 119 For more data on tbt: unpact of communuy Mlt: on 
altruism, see id. at 463 (listing rt:ft:rt:nces for Chapter 7 of Putnam·~ book cntlllcd "AltrUism. 
Volunteering, and Philanthropy"). 
101. /d. at 274-75. Baby boomers feU mulway llctwccn tho-.e two group~. ld. at 275. 
102. ld 
103. /d. at 277--84. 
104. Pt.Ji'AM. supra note 90. at 281-82. 
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each others' safety and children.1<>5 Nor does this argument lead to a 
call for return to the smaller, traditional communities of yesteryear 
(which tended toward complete homogeneity and, often, rigid author-
itarianism).106 Rather, as Etzioni argues, " [w]hat we need now are 
communities that balance both diversity and unity . .. we need to 
strengthen the communitarian elements in the urban and suburban 
centers, to provide the social bonds that sustain the moral voice, but at 
the same time avoid tight networks that suppress pluralism and 
dissent." 107 
In an effort to sketch the communitarian agenda, Etzioni has 
drafted a document called The Responsive Communitarian Platform: 
Rig/us and Responsibilities.108 One point made in the platform is that 
communities are weakened when tasks they should rightfully perform 
are usurped by larger institutions: "Generally, no social task should be 
assigned to an institution that is larger than necessary to do the job 
.... What can be done at the LocaJ level should not be passed on to 
the state or federal level[.]"109 The platform then articulates duties 
that communities should expect from their members, notably voting 
and jury service. 110 
B. Postmodem Theory: The Interpretive Community 
In his famous book Is There a Text in this Class?,111 literary theorist 
Stanley Fish took on the conundrum that was the raging debate in 
literary circles of the time: does meaning reside in the text or is it 
105. See H r:RnERr J. GA"<S. THE URRAN VJLLAC1FK!i: GRoUP AND CLA'>S 1:-1 Tllf Lu·~;; OF 
1 JALIA"~·At.1ERJCANS 14-15 (1%'2); see also JL\1 SLEEPI· R, Cwsrq 01- STRA'OGLK!i. LmrRAIISM 
A.''ID nu Pouncs OF RACE 1"1 'Lw YoRK (1990). cited in ETZrovr, TH.E SPrRrT o t- Co,tM\Il'-11 v. 
supra note 72, at 120. Daniel Bell makes a sunilar pomt: in refuting the argument that people 
are less "determined by, and attached to, their home if they're from 1he large cr lles of con tempo· 
rdry 'IOciety than if they were born and bred in the small communities of the past," Bell's com· 
munitarian character Anne a)ks: "Have you seen any Woody Allen £i.lms? Do you not think that 
New York JS con:;titutivc of Woody Allen's identity?" Bnr, supra note 81. al 105-06. 
106. See ET7tOI'I. Trrr SPJK.IT or CO.'I!I.MUNffY, wpra note 72. at 122. 
107. /d. 
108. ld. at 251~7. As the author explain), the platform was first drafted by Euiont h1mseli, 
and wa~ later significanlly edited and rewritten by a large number of others. includmg Mary Ann 
Glendon and William Galston. It was eventually endorsed by seventy leading Americans. both 
conservative and liberal. /d. at 251. 
109. Jd. at 260. 
110. /d. at 261. Elsewhere m his book, Etzioni describes communities as '·Chinese nesting 
boxes, in which less encompassmg communities (famrhes, neighborhoods) are nestled within 
more encompassing ones (local villages and towns), \\ h1ch m tum are situated wnhin still more 
encompassing communities, the national and cross-nallonal ones:' ET7rOr-<J. supra note 72. at 
32. He also notes that some communuies. like profe 10nal or work-based ones. arc not geo· 
graphtcally based. Jd. 
I ll. FisH. supra no te 11. 
98 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:79 
constructed by the reader of the text? Choosing either of those op-
tions was problematic: if the text had determinate meaning, then how 
to explain disagreement? But if individual readers determined the 
meaning so that a text's meaning varies with each reader, then how to 
explain agreement? Fish sought an explanation accounting for both 
agreement and disagreement, and thus set out to answer how a 
postmodernist like himself who "preach[ ed] the instability of the text 
and the unavailability of determinate meanings"112 could explain how 
different people could find the same meaning in a given text.113 He 
did so by articulating the concept of the "interpretive community," 
which he later described as: 
[N]ot so much a group of individuals who shared a point of view, 
but a point of view or way of organizing experience that shared indi-
viduals in the sense that its assumed distinctions, categories of un-
derstanding, and stipulations of relevance and irrelevance were the 
content of the consciousness of community members who were 
therefore no longer individuals, but, insofar as they were embedded 
in the community's enterprise, community property ... such com-
munity-constituted interpreters would, in their turn, constitute, 
more or less in agreement, the same text, although the sameness 
would not be attributable to the self-identity of the text, but to the 
communal nature of the interpretive act.tt4 
Fish's idea of the interpretive community thus suggests that peo-
ples' understanding of texts, and indeed of facts,115 and presumably of 
norms, is constructed by the communities of which they are a part. He 
is careful to distinguish this view from subjectivity or relativism: it is 
not relativistic because "a shared basis of agreement at once guid[ es] 
interpretation and provid[es] a mechanism for deciding between inter-
pretations;"116 it is not subjective because the interpretive strategies 
112. Jd. at 305. 
113. Or explain, for that matter, how meaningful human communication could ever occur. 
See id. at 303-04. 
114. STANLEY F. FrsH, DmNo WHAT CoMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE 
PRACTICE OP THEoRY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 141 (1989) (hereinafter DoiNG WHAT 
CoMES NATURALLY]. 
115. Disagreements cannot be resolved by reference to the facts , because the facts 
emerge only in the context of some point of view ... disagreements must occur be-
tween those who hold (or are held by) different points of view, and what is at stake in a 
disagreement is the right to specify what the facts can hereafter be said to be. Dis-
agreements are not settled by the facts, but are the means by which the facts are settled. 
FISH, supra note 11, at 338. 
116. /d. at 317. Indeed, Fish argues that: 
(N]o one can be a relativist. because no one can achieve the distance from his own 
beliefs and assumptions which would result in their being no more authoritative for him 
than the beliefs and assumptions held by others. or, for that matter, the beliefs and 
assumptions he himself used to hold. 
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by which meanings are constructed are "social and conventional. " 117 
Moreover, Fish characterizes interpretive communities as "engines of 
change because [their] assumptions are not a mechanism for shutting 
out the world but for organizing it, for seeing phenomena as already 
related to the interests and goals that make the community what it 
is." 118 And though persons within interpretive communities are not 
free agents, since their interpretive assumptions and strategies are a 
product of the community of which they are a part, neither are their 
ideas (nor those of their communities) fixed or immutable. Rather, 
both the members and their interpretive communities are constantly 
evolving, in an ongoing project that is "at the same time assimilative 
and self-transforming." 119 
Later in his career, Fish explicitly applied his ideas about literary 
interpretation to law. In a series of essays framed as debates between 
Fish and the leading legal theorists of the day,120 Fish exported the 
central problem of literary theory-that is, what is the source of inter-
pretive authority, the text or the reader-to the context of legal inter-
pretation. In particular, he focused on the process of judging: as 
judges make decisions. they must use texts in the form of both prece-
dents and statutes.121 In these essays, Fish continued to argue that 
legal interpreters (that is, judges) are neither constrained by embed-
ded meaning in the text nor wholly free to imbue the text with 
whatever meaning they might choose. Rather, 
(i)nterpreters are constrained by their tacit awareness of what is 
possible and not possible to do, what is and is not a reasonable thing 
to say, what will and will not be heard as evidence, in a given enter-
prise; and it is within those same constraints that they see and bring 
others to see the shape of the documents to whose interpretation 
they are committed. 122 
!d. at 319. lnterpreten. do not, and m fact cannot, act on tbetr own; they are "extensions of an 
institutional community [and thus) solipsism and relatJvtsm are removed as fears because they 
are not possible modes of being." /d. at 321. 
117. !d. at 331 ("[T)he 'you' who docs the interpretauve work •.. ts a communal you and not 
an isolated mdiVidual.~). 
l18. STASLEY FtsH. Changt, m Dol.I'Oo WnAT Co"1rs 'A rURALLY. supra note 114. at 150. 
l19. !d. at 152. 
120. Stt STANLEY Ftsll, Workmg on tht Cham Gan.1r lnttrprttauon m I .ow and Littraturt, in 
Domo WHAT Co:.tEs NATURALLY, supra note 114. at 87-102 (debate between Ft hand Ronald 
Dworkin); STANLEY FISH, Fish v. Fiss, m Dot~";O WIIAT CoMES NATLRALLY, supra note 114, at 
120-40 (debate between Ftsh and Owen Fiss); STANLrY Ft~u. Don't Know Much About tht 
Middlt Ages: Posntr on Law and Literature. m Dot~";G WIIAT CoMES NAtURALLY, supra note 
114, at 294-311 (debate between Fish and R.tcbard Po ner). 
121. Set generally FTSH, Doll'Oo WHAT Co:.tEl> ~An RAU.Y. supra note 114. 
122. STANLEY FtsH, Working on the Chain Gang: lnttrpretauon in Law and Ltttraturt, m Do-
tNO WHAT Co-.res NATURALLY. supra note 114. at 98 (in response to Dworktn). Set also 
STANLY FtsH, Fish v. Fiss, m DOING WHAT COl>tES NAT\IRALLY, supra note l14, at 126 (in 
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Fish's notions that the law, as any other text, cannot and does not 
operate as a self-executing constraint in the process of judging and 
that interpretations are the product of community-based understand-
ings and assumptions have important implications for the work of ju-
ries. indeed, juries may be understood to be an artificially-created 
interpretive community,123 formed in a particular case to construct a 
factual history and then to render its legal meaning. The work of ju-
ries throughout a trial is interpretation in the sense Fish describes: the 
texts to be interpreted are presented in formats both evidentiary (doc-
umentary and testimonial) and instructive (jury instructions on the 
law). Thus, when a jury is required to decide whether conduct is "neg-
ligent'' or "reckless" or, in a death penalty case, whether there are 
'·mitigating" or ''aggravating" circumstances, its decision is the culmi-
nation of a series of interpretive acts. And those acts are not just the 
sum of the individual responses of the twelve jurors involved to the 
evidence presented and the instructions given, but in a larger sense 
are the product of the embedded understandings and assumptions of 
the interpretive communities of which those jurors are a part. 
IV. SY~TllESIZTNG THEORY AND PRAcrTCE: 
WHY COMMUNITY MA ITERS 
In this section, I consider the implications of the theoretical prob-
lem of defining the relevant community from which a fair cross-sec-
tion of jurors must be drawn in light of the very practical reality that 
much more of our criminal law is now being prosecuted at the federal 
level. I turn first to a description of this federalization trend and then 
to an analysis of its effect given the demographic data presented ear-
lier, in light of the communitarian and postmodern theory. Finally, I 
return to our case study of the inner-city murder scenario as an illus-
tration of why the notion of the relevant "community'' might indeed 
make a very real difference. 
response to Fi'>S: nettber the text nor "disciplining rules'' can operate as a constraint on interpre-
tation. and the "fear of unbndled interpretation-of interpreters whose determinations of mean-
ing are unconstrruned-is ba~eless:} 
123. This ts not to say that because it is artifictaUy created that the jury is some sort of new or 
freestanding rntcrpretive community. Central to FISh's argument is the notion that one cannot 
extricate oneself from the embedded assumptions and understandings that inform one·~ inter-
pretattons. Thus. jurors could ne,er come to a JUry room as blank slates to form a ne" interpre-
tive community divorced from their prevtous SOCial contextS. But this. of course. supports my 
argument: it is precisely becau~e jurors bring thelf pre-existing Mmterpretive communi!Jes" with 
them to the jury room that their role in establishing and confirming social norms is so important. 
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A. The Federalization of Street Crime 
In 1997, the American Bar Association (ABA) formed a task force 
to examine the federalization trend in criminal law.124 The ABA Task 
Force, chaired by former Attorney General Edwin Meese,125 docu-
mented that the trend exists and characterized it negatively. as "inap-
propriate federalization. "J2t~ 
The ABA Task Force began its report by tracing the history of fed-
eral criminal law. In the early years of the Republic, the federal gov-
ernment had jurisdiction to prosecute very few crimes, 127 all of which 
had to do with harm done to the federal government itseU.128 The 
states exercised virtually exclusive control over criminal enforcement. 
largely because crime was viewed as "a uniquely local concem."129 
The federal government made its first forays into what had previously 
been viewed as subjects within the states' police power in the years 
following the Civil War.Jl<> Notabl), Congress located its constitu-
tional power to reach crime formerly within the states' exclusive pur-
view in the Commerce Clause.111 Given the rapid technological 
change of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the in-
creasing movement of people. goods and services in interstate com-
merce became a justification for federal intrusion into the criminal law 
via the Commerce Clause. The movement toward federalization ac-
celerated during the New Deal years and beyond; indeed, today there 
are more than 3,000 federal crimes.• ~2 The ABA Task Force further 
124 \t•t' James A. Slraudla, lht' Federuli:.ation of Crimin.ll Law, 1991l A.B.A CtU\t. Jll\t. 
St-<.. T """' ORCT~ 
125. ~cmbc:nhtp in the tn k force included JUdge:,, former members of Congrc.;s, former 
Uniled Slate<; Attorney~. academic.. Ia\\ enforcement per.,onnel. and private practitionen.. Su 
id. a1 261 npp. D. 
126. /d at 45 
127. St•r Kathleen F. Bnckey. Tht• Commua Clal/.11! and Frderali;:t'd Crtmt: A Tale of Two 
11tit·H~f. 'i43 Ar-;r-:"LS A'f AcAD PoL. & S<K Sn. 27. 2R (1996) (~[seventeen! cnmes 
formed the entire body of federal cnmmal law two centunc~ ago "). 
12R SlraLella, wpra note 124. at 'i. Su alw Sara Sun Beale. F,:deralt:.ing Crunt: A Hessing tht' 
Impact (•n tltt' Fedaal Co11rts. 54'3 A"''AI'> A't AcAn. PoL. & Soc S< 1 39. 40 (1996) 
(~[F)~d~ral offenses of the tim~ includ~d treason. bnbcn of fl!deral offiCials. perjury in fed~ral 
court. thdt of governml!nl propert), and revenue fraud Smce the fed~ral government\\&~ ~mall 
and it conducted few program~. the list of actiOn\ class1fJed as of(en~s for lhc protection of 
federal 1nteres1s Will. corre\pondingly restncled. "). 
129. Stranella. \llpra note 124. a1 6. 
I 'II. /d 
111. Su Bnckey. ~11pra note 127, at 28. 
I ~2 /d. Indeed, thb number may be low. The ABA Ta~k rorce noted the difficulty of count· 
mg fl!deral crime~. hccausc •there ts no com·cniently acce ~thll!, complete lisl of federal crimes.~ 
Strauella. 111pra note 124. at 9. Cnminal ~ncllons arc wide ly di pcr;ed throujlhout federal stat-
utory .md administrative Ia~. nearly 10.000 fed~ral regulation~ mention sanctions of either a 
cnmmal or civil natur~. /d. at 10 n.ll. 
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noted that the trend, far from abating, is growing.133 Over 40% of 
federal criminal provisions passed by Congress since the Civil War 
were passed in the period since 1970.134 The 105th Congress intro-
duced an estimated 1,000 biJJs with some connection to criminal 
law.135 The Task Force further noted the concomitant growth in the 
size of federal criminal justice services, necessitated by the growing 
number of crimes processed in the federal system.J36 
The ABA Task Force attributed the federalization trend to Con-
gress's "patchwork response" to newsworthy events and the political 
popularity of crime legislation.137 Moreover, there seems to have 
been a systemic failure of federalism reflected in the trend: federal 
crime legislation passes without meaningful analysis of whether state 
and local governments are better equipped to deal with the prob-
lem.l38 Much of this legislation overlaps, or even duplicates, existing 
state law.139 
Having assembled the statistics that document the federalization 
trend, the Task Force turned its attention to an analysis of the impact 
of this trend on both the federal system140 and state and local govern-
ments. The Task Force concluded that there was no persuasive evi-
dence that federalizing crime had a demonstrable, significant impact 
on public safety.141 The reason for this may be that despite the stag-
geringly increased number of federal crimes, the pursuit of actual fed-
eral prosecutions is still somewhat limited by resource issues. 142 Thus, 
"the selection of which crimes to investigate and prosecute therefore 
133. Jd. at 11. 
134. /d. at 7. 
135. !d. at 11. 
136. /d. at 13. "[B)etween 1982 and 1993, overall federal justice system expenditures in-
creased at twice the rate of comparable state and local expenditures, increasing 317% as com-
pared to 163'¥o." StrazzeUa. supra note 124. at 14. 
137. ld. at 14-15. 
138. ld. at 15. Chief Justice Rehnquist has also weighed in on this problem. He has noted, in 
reference to recently enacted federal statutes expanding federal JUrisdiction, that " the questton 
of whether the states are doing an adequate job ... was never seriously asked." William H. 
Rehoquisl. Addre.~s tO the American Law Institute, in REMARKS AND ADDRESSJ::S AT THC 75TH 
A"~\JAL ALI MErTI,..G, MAv 1998. at 18 (1998). 
139. Brickey, supra note 127, at 37. See also Philip B. Heymann & Mark H. Moore, The 
Federal Role m Dealing with Violent Street Crime: Principles, Quesrions and Cautions, 543 AN-
NAL.~ A'-1. A cAD. PoL. & Soc. Sn 103, 110 (1996) ("Street crimes are accepted as a local re-
sponsibility and state government can readily create the law enforcement advantages enjoyed by 
the federal government by stmply changing the statutes that define crimes, procedures, and 
sentences."). 
140. Strazzella, supra note 124. at 35-42. 
141. /d. at 18. 
142. /d. Federal prosecutions constitute fewer than 5% of all prosecutions in the country. /d. 
at 19. 
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requires a decisionmaking process which reflects highly selective pri-
oritizing by investigative agencies and federal prosecutors.''143 
This selectivity in federal prosecution, requiring as it does the exer-
cise of federal prosecutorial discretion,144 yields another potential 
concern given the demographic data of the relevant state and federal 
jury pools. That is, it raises the possibility that the federal 
prosecutorial power could be invoked in order to avoid an expected 
outcome in particular state prosecutions based on the expected demo-
graphic makeup of the jury pool.t45 
The Task Force concluded its study by characterizing the federaliza-
tion trend as troubling.146 In particular, they expressed deep concern 
that local values would be lost in the rush to federalize crime and im-
pose national standards: 
Local crimes involve local values and should be handled by state 
law. Each state's criminal justice system embodies a series of state 
decisions about what conduct should be subjected to governmental 
control and criminal sanctions (prison or fine) and about what so-
cially unacceptable conduct should be left outside those criminal 
prohibitions (left perhaps to private social pressures, to moral re-
straints, or perhaps to non-criminal suits between individuals or be-
tween governmental agencies and individuals). Community views 
also differ from state to state on related issues: the appropriate lim-
its on police investigative practices, acceptable prosecutorial discre-
tion, the locale of trials, suitable court procedures and rules of 
evidence, the exact penal consequences that should accompany con-
viction, and the wisest allocation of limited resources to confront 
the important problem of crime. In the participatory democracy of 
our large nation, with varying local values, citizen views about such 
matters are more likely to be felt and acted upon through represent-
atives at the local level, rather than at the federal level where most 
of those in power are more removed from the affected local values 
and more preoccupied with issues of national and international 
concem.147 
Though the Task Force expressed its concern in relation to the com-
munity's role in articulating criminal standards through its elected rep-
143. /d. at 18. 
144. The Task Force noted the basically unreviewable discretion of federal prosecutors as to 
whether to bring particular prosecutions, and that state prosecutors are usually more dtrectly 
accountable to the electorate. /d. at 32- 35. 
145. Indeed, tt is possible that federal death penalty prosecutions are bemg undertaken pre-
ctsely because the states where the crime occurred either do not ha"e the death penalty or are 
unlikely to impose it. For example, Michigan does not have a death penalty; federal prosecu-
uons for murder there make the defendant subJeCt to capital punishment in contravention of the 
apparent will of the majority of people in Michigan. 
146. StrazzeUa. supra note 124. at 43. 
147. /d. at 44 (emphasis added). 
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resentatives (that is, legislatively) and thus the direct impact on state 
and local governments, its conclusions apply with equal force to the 
community's role in giving content to criminal standards through jury 
service. In both contexts, more localized community norms are better 
expressed through more localized prosecutions. 
B. The Implications of a More Localized Understanding of 
Community for Drawing a Fair Cross-Section of Jurors 
If the community to be represented by the fair cross-section of the 
jury is better defined at a more local level, then the concern becomes 
the monoEthic character of many communities. One thinks immedi-
ately of the nearly all-white jury in Simi Valley, California, that acquit-
ted the police officers who, as all the world knew from the videotape, 
had beaten Rodney King. 148 As Putnam notes, communities often 
produce negative externalities for those outside their boundaries. Is it 
possible to preserve the positive values of local communities without 
ensconcing negative ones? 
This huge question harkens back to a point long debated by com-
munitarians and liberals as to the normative value of a community's 
views. Without purporting to take on that debate here, we can per-
haps escape the conundrum by developing a more nuanced and situa-
tional definition of what "community" (or poEty) is relevant for a 
particular purpose.149 It is fitting that a much larger community-
namely, the state-defines through the criminal code what behavior 
148. See Kenneth B. Nuno, Rights 1/e/d /lostage: Race, Ideology and the Peremptory Clwl· 
lengt, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rrv. 63 (1993): 
lo the spnng of 1991. a gang of baton-\'vte ldmg Los Angelt!s pohce officers savagely 
beat motorist Rodney King at the interseclton of Foothill Boulevard and Chborne 
Street. By a quirk or fate, a bystander captured the assault on "ideotape and, wnhm 
days, much or the nat1on became w1tnes) to the excesses of the Los Angeles Police 
Department. Most Amencans reacted wtth shock and outrage to this apparent police 
rampage and the Department"s subsequent cover-up attempt Yet. thtrtcen month) 
later, a JUry of ten whites. one l..atmo and one Astan-Amencan returned vcrdtcts or 
acquittal on teo of the eleven charges filed agamst the officers. 
/d. at 63 (citmg Report of the Independent CommLuion nn the l.os Angt'les Police /Jepartn11mt 7 
(July 9. 1991)). 
149. Daniel Bell, through his character of the commumtarian Anne, approache~ the problem 
this way: 
While I don't think one can appeal to -obJeCtive- \laodards or morality. ~tandards not 
dependent on the actual historical proc~ of ~ieties. there's another pos.s1b1bty-a 
universalism rooted in the convergence or people's uoderstaodmg of ccrt.nn core moral 
proposlltons. Every society, 11 seems, has come to accept a bare~~ of prohlblllons-<>n 
murder, deception. betrayal, and gross cruelty-prolubittons which con~IJtutc a ktnd of 
minimal and universal moral code. 
BELl , 111pra note 81. at 76. 
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will be sanctioned by the criminal process. 150 But where the criminal 
code leaves issues to be determined by jury (community) discretion, a 
more localized vision of community may better serve the end of af-
firming community values. 
Note that this is decidedly not an argument for anything akin to jury 
nullification (of which, arguably, the first Rodney King verdict in Simi 
Valley is an example). Ifthe criminal code defines aggravated battery 
as the use of deadly force on another person, and the evidence shows 
that the defendant did that, the jury is not free to ignore either the law 
or the evidence. But if the law asks the jury to give content to words 
as vague as "mitigating circumstances" that would obviate a death 
sentence, the community's values take center stage in the deliberation 
process. 
Moreover, while concerns about self-interested community action 
are real, and are vividly illustrated by such outrages as the first Rod-
ney King verdict, they do not obviate the need for, and indeed the 
inevitability of, the community performing its norm-setting func-
tion.151 That is, inevitably some community, acting through some in-
stitutional vehicle, will set moral norms. The project thus becomes a 
question of allocating moral questions to the appropriate polity.1s2 
My position is that local communities, charged as they have tradi-
tionally and historically been with the execution of the criminal law, 
continue to be the better arbiters of ambiguities within the law. The 
federalization trend in criminal law is divesting local communities of 
that traditional role, and is doing so at the expense of both community 
values and genuine racial diversity in the jury system. For whatever 
geographical polity defines the community from which a fair cross-
section of jurors will be drawn will then establish its social norms 
through the juries' decisionmaking. And just as gerrymandered politi-
cal districts frequently have the effect of diluting minority voting 
150. In 1ht! Spirit of Commumty, E t11oni makes a sim1lar point 10 his explication of the com-
mumtarian agenda: he notes the importance of the "soc1al webs that communities provide, m 
neighborhoods, at work, and in ethnic clubs and associa tions" and that "government needs to 
refrain from usurpmg [the commumties' institutionall functions.'' ErLJONI, supra note 72, a t 
248. Etzioni further arguel> that " the natio nal socie ty mu.<;t ensure that local communit1es w11l 
not lock in values that we. as a more encompassmg and overriding community, abhor[ .)" /d. 
151. Indeed, American society is replete with examples of local deviallon from national 
norms-consider the perl>istencc of school prayer in many areas in contravention o f the Supreme 
Court ruhngs that such practices violate the First Amendment. 
152. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Supreme Court struck down, as violative of 
national equal pro tection norms, a Colorado stale con titutional amendment adopted by refe ren-
dum that was designed to undo protections given to gay and lesbian Citizens by local governmen-
tal entities). 
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power,153 federalized jury districts have the effect of diluting minority 
community values that would otherwise be expressed through crimi-
nal juries drawn more locally in state courts. 
The key is to understand the local community's function, through 
the institution of the criminal jury in individual trials, as giving imme-
diate, fact-based content to the larger community's moral proclama-
tions as expressed in the criminal code. This approach avoids the 
potential dangers of separatist local community action (as in the Simi 
Valley Rodney King verdict) while preserving the community-
strengthening and legitimating effects of local decisionmaking. The 
local jury thus acts as the interpreter and enforcer, in particularized 
fact situations, of the supracommunity's more general value judg-
ments. As Etzioni notes, "the more one favors strengthening commu-
nities ... the more one must concern oneself with ensuring that they 
see themselves as parts of a more encompassing whole, rather than as 
fully independent and antagonistic. "154 He further argues that this 
makes it possible for smaller, constituent communities "to follow their 
own subsets of values without endangering the body society, as long as 
they accept these shared values. " 155 The problem posed by the feder-
alization of criminal juries is that these subsets of values held in mi-
nority communities, though not incompatible with the larger 
community's "shared values" as expressed in the criminal code, are in 
danger of being subsumed by the larger majority.156 
Indeed, the notion of "constitutive communities" that give content 
to one's values may have particular resonance in a minority commu-
nity. Recall that communitarian theory uses community members' 
self-identification as a means of identifying community.157 In answer 
153. Kim Forde·Mazrui has argued that jurors should no longer be drawn on an at-large basis 
from the judicial district that hosts the trial. Rather, courts should sub<hvide thctr dtstricts mto 
"jural districts" in an effort to capture "communities of interest" as that concept has been devel· 
oped by the Supreme Court in electoral districting cases. Fordc-MazrUI. supra note I, at 388-95 
Jurors for particular cases would be selected such that each of those diStricts would be repre· 
sented in the petit jury, or at least the verure. rn the electoral context, the Supreme Court has 
approved the use of race as a factor (though not the wle factor) along v.ith other demographic 
charactensucs like pohucal affiliation and socioeconomic status, Ill drawing legt lal!ve districts. 
!d. at 383-84. ThiS plan would thus promote the representation of minority groups on JUries, as 
long as the "jural districts" are drawn to capture neighborhoods with a htgh minonty populatton. 
As Professor Forde-Mazrui acknowledges, however, the plan would tmpose stgmficant admiDJS· 
trative burdens and costs. Jd. at 400-03. 
154. ETZIOM, supra note 72, at 155. 
155. !d. at 157. 
156. As b.tghlighted ear her, this is akin to the problem of the dilution of minonty votmg power 
by gerrymandermg electoral districts. Set diSCUSSton wpra Part li.C. 
157. Stt supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text (Damel Bell's dtscus ion of constitunve 
communities). 
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to the question "who are you?," how many whites in America would 
answer "I am white"? Whiteness as an identity is obviated by a soci-
ety that privileges whiteness in countless overt and covert ways.tss 
But identification with a minority racial or ethnic group is more likely 
to be a key component of one's self-understanding in a society that 
often oppresses and suppresses that group. Thus, there is arguably an 
obligation on the larger supracommunity to arrange its institutions 
(such as the jury) in a way that allows expression of values held dear 
in minority communities.ts9 
C. From Theory to Practice: A Case Study in the Effect of 
Federally Diluted Jury Pools 
This section addresses the question whether the confluence of the 
demographic effect of the federalization of crime with the communi-
tarian and postmodern theory explored above has any real world im-
plications. The case study described in the introduction will serve as a 
vehicle to examine that question. Imagine a gun-store robbery/mur-
der allegedly committed by an African-American youth in Philadel-
phia. If the youth is tried in the state court system, his jury will be 
drawn from the county of Philadelphia, where the African-American 
population constitutes 43.2% of the total population.160 If he is 
charged under federal law and tried in the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, the African-American population would be 16.8%. 
Of course, neither of these figures portends any particular demo-
graphic makeup of the petit jury that will try the case. The question 
becomes, then, whether the added probability of having any black jury 
members makes a difference. Empirical research indicates that it 
does. David Baldus and colleagues studied data on capital juries in 
Philadelphia in the years 1984 through 1994.161 Their findings indicate 
that "black defendants are treated less punitively vis-a-vis nonblack 
defendants as the proportion of blacks on the juries increases.''162 
158. Su generally IA.'I AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCOSVEl'<TJONAL EvJOE.'ICE oF 
RACE A~'<D GE:-~oER DJSCRL\.1lNATION (2001) (documentmg race discrimination effects m con-
texts such as car buymg and kidney transplantation). 
159. One might even frame an argument that this obligation is analogous to that justifying 
remedial measures in cases of de jure diScrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. 
160. See tbl. DP-1 (Ph1ladelpb.Ja County, Pa.). supra note 55, available at http://censtats.cen-
sus.gov'data!PA/05042l0 l.pdf. 
161. DaVId Baldus et al .. Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era. 
An Emptrical and Ltgal O~·ervtew, wall Recent Findmgs from Philadelphia, 83 Co~U;ELL L. REv. 
1638 (1998) [hereinafter Baldus et al.. Ractal Ducrimmation). See also DaVId Baldus et al., The 
Use of Peremptory Challenge.) in Capital Murdtr Trials· A Legal and Empmcal Analysis. 3 U PA. 
J. Co!'ST. L. 3 (2001) [hereinafter Baldus et al., The Ure of Peremptory Challenges). 
162. Baldus et al., Rac~al Discrmtination, supra note 161, at 1721 n.l59. 
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Moreover, as the number of black jurors increases, death sentences 
become less likely.163 Similar findings emerged from the Capital Jury 
Project, which is a national study of the decisionmaking of capital ju-
rors, based on interviews with 1,155 capital jurors involved in 340 tri-
als in fourteen different states. 164 The study's authors found two 
strong impacts of jury racial composition in cases involving black de-
fendants and white victims, which they referred to as the "white male 
dominance'' effect and the "black male pre ence" effect.H•~ 
Specifically, 
[t]he presence of five or more white males on the jury dramaticaUy 
increased the likelihood of a death sentence between ... . cases with 
four and those with five white male jurors (23.1% vs. 63.2%) .... 
[and tjhe presence of black male JUror-. in these BfW cases, by con-
trast, substantiall} reduced the likelihood of a death sentence.166 
The addition of one black male juror made a stark statistical differ-
ence: "[i]n the absence of black male jurors, death sentences were im-
posed in 71.9% of the cases, as compared to 42.9°/o when one black 
male was on the jury."167 Significantly, the authors found that these 
effects were independent of one another, further intensifying the sta-
tistical disparity.t68 
It thus becomes apparent that juror decisionmaking in capital cases 
is highly sensitive to the demographic makeup of the jury. Substan-
tively, this is no doubt related to the areas of discretion built into capi-
tal sentencing schemes. For example, Pennsylvania law requires 
jurors in capital cases to consider aggravating and mitigating factors in 
determining whether the death penalty should be irnposed.169 Many 
of the listed statutory factors engage the jurors in a discretionary eval-
uation of highly contextualized conduct.170 This dtscretionary space is 
163. See Baldus et al., Thr Urr uf Pt:remptnn Challenge.\. supra note 161 
164 William J. Bowers et al .. Death SenJencmg 111 Black and Whue An Empim·ul Anal.Hi.s of 
the Roll' of Juron Race and Jurv Ruetal Compo\ition, 3 U PA. J. CO!'o.l>J l . 171. l!i9 (2001). 
Black juror:. compr~d 9JI% of the enure 'ample. /d 
165. ld at 192-93. 
166. ld <II 193. 
167 /d. "The difference rO'C: to th1rty-four point'> when the compan~on was between none 
and one or more blad. male juror\ (71 9% vs. 37.5'Yo)." /d. 
168. That IS, " 10 the ab-.ence of while male dominance. the pre~ence of one hlact.: male JUror 
}ielded" an even lower rate of impos1t10n of the death <;entcncc; eonver:.cly. the ah«nce of black 
male JUrors yielded an even lughcr rate: of unpo ition. Bowers et al , lUpra note IM. at 19J ·9~ . 
169. Su 42 PA. Co' . STAr. § 9711 (200~). lndee:d, thi~ 1s typtcal of the cap1tal sentencing 
schemes of the ~tate' that unpose the de:ath penalty, and of the federal capital <;entencmg statute. 
See 18 U.SC. § 3592 (2000). 
170. For example. JUrors rrught be called upon to dectdc whether ·[t]hc defendant was under 
the influence: of extreme mental or emotional (.bsturbance" 42 P" Co''· SlAT ~ 971l(el(2). 
Cf 18 U.S.C § 3592(a)(2) (''The defendant was under unusual anJ c;ub:.tant ial dure~.,. regardless 
of whether the duress was of such a degree a.~ to eonshtute a defcn<.e to the charge.") 
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exactly the reason why juries drawn from a fair cross-section of the 
relevant community are so important. 
V. CoNCLuSION 
The criminal justice system, understood in its broadest sense to in-
clude the combined law enforcement efforts of both federal and state 
governments, relies for its legitimacy on a sense of public investment, 
most importantly manifested in the direct community participation of 
the criminal jury. The trend toward federalization of crime, particu-
larly street crime, threatens that legitimacy by removing the immedi-
acy of local control and changing the demographics of those called to 
serve on juries. And this is not merely a theoretical threat: as I have 
demonstrated, federalization in capital cases can possibly, and quite 
literally, mean the difference between life and death. 
The impact of this apparently gathering trend 171 thus becomes 
something akin to the dilution effect observed in voting rights cases. 
Just as the minority vote gets diluted in at-large districting schemes, 
but can be captured by demographically-sensitive districting, the val-
ues of minority communities are more likely to be subsumed in juries 
drawn from larger federal districts than they would be in smaller, 
county-based state court juries. 
One question worth exploring is whether there is a causal connec-
tion between the federalization of crime and the minority dilution ef-
fect on criminal juries. Regardless, the effect is real, and ought to be a 
consideration both for legislators who define crime and officials who 
select which prosecutions to pursue. The legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system is at stake. 
171. See wpm Pans JV.A. and rv.c (dcscnbing growmg trend of fedcrali7ing crime). 
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